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There is a growing interest for the determinants of human choice behavior in social set-
tings. Upon initial contact, investment choices in social settings can be inherently risky, as
the degree to which the other person will reciprocate is unknown. Nevertheless, people
have been shown to exhibit prosocial behavior even in one-shot laboratory settings where
all interaction has been taken away. A logical step has been to link such behavior to trait
empathy-related neurobiological networks. However, as a social interaction unfolds, the
degree of uncertainty with respect to the expected payoff of choice behavior may change
as a function of the interaction. Here we attempt to capture this factor. We show that the
interpersonal tie one develops with another person during interaction – rather than trait
empathy – motivates investment in a public good that is shared with an anonymous inter-
action partner.We examined how individual differences in trait empathy and interpersonal
ties modulate neural responses to imposed monetary sharing.After, but not before interac-
tion in a public good game, sharing prompted activation of neural systems associated with
reward (striatum), empathy (anterior insular cortex and anterior cingulate cortex) as well
as altruism, and social signiﬁcance [posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS)]. Although
these activations could be linked to both empathy and interpersonal ties, only tie-related
pSTS activation predicted prosocial behavior during subsequent interaction, suggesting a
neural substrate for keeping track of social relevance.
Keywords: interpersonal ties, social ties, empathy, social decision-making, public good game, pSTS,ACC, insula
INTRODUCTION
In experience-based decision-making,rather than being provided
with a description of the probability distribution of outcomes
associated with certain choices, subjects have incomplete infor-
mation about choice outcomes and their respective probabili-
ties. Information regarding choice–outcome is acquired and inte-
grated through continuous or pre-choice sampling with feedback.
Evidence seems to suggest that people have different choice–
preferences in decisions-from-experience paradigms than dur-
ing description-based choice paradigms, although the origins of
this putative preference gap are still under investigation (Rakow
and Newell, 2010). Given the naturalistic nature of experience-
based decision-making, disentangling its underlying cognitive
and neural mechanisms may be crucial to understanding human
choice behavior. Economic trade for example, is an omnipresent
real-world example of experience-based decision-making. The
probability distribution of outcomes during economic interac-
tionscanoftenonlybegaugedthroughtheinteractionitself.Inter-
estingly,intermediate outcomes of the interaction may impact the
probability distribution of future outcomes, lessening the degree
ofuncertaintyalongtheway.Hence,notonlyisthesubjectgauging
the probability distribution of outcomes, he or she may actually
modulate the probability distribution of outcomes as the interac-
tion unfolds. It has been suggested that interaction partners keep
track of this dynamic process internally by means of the interper-
sonal tie one develops with one’s interaction partner (van Dijk
et al.,2002; vanWinden et al.,2008).Another suggested inﬂuence
on human choice behavior in social settings has been the presence
of empathy (e.g., Hein et al., 2010). Here, we attempt to establish
howwellatraitvariablelikeempathyandadynamicstatevariable
such as the interpersonal tie are able to predict prosocial choices
during interactive decision-making.
Thewillingnesstoshareresourceswithoutguaranteeof return-
beneﬁt is crucial to achieve cooperation. This is illustrated by the
PublicGoodfamilyof economicgames,wherefreeridingtypically
leads to a breakdown of cooperation (Isaac and Walker, 1988).
Experimental evidence suggests that the willingness to invest in
a public good (including the voluntary punishment of free rid-
ers) is motivated by social factors beyond immediate personal
gain (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Rilling et al., 2002). These factors
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are often captured using the term altruism, which is observed in
humans as well as various other mammals (Fehr and Fischbacher,
2003; de Waal, 2008). Many have linked the proximate cause of
altruism to empathy, referring to the capacity to experience and
understand the affective state of another person (Batson, 1991;
Eisenberg,2000;deWaal,2008;SingerandLamm,2009).Recently,
neuralevidencehasbeenpresentedinsupportof thisview,linking
empathy-relatedactivationintheinsula(Heinetal.,2010;Masten
etal.,2011)andmedialprefrontalcortex(Mathuretal.,2010;Mas-
ten et al., 2011) to prosocial behavior. Empathy promotes social
cohesion (Farrow et al.,2001),scales with feelings of group mem-
bership (Sturmer et al.,2006) and as such may be a key motive for
the willingness to share.
Individual differences in the willingness to share are often
described in terms of social value orientations (Van Lange, 1999),
which can be estimated by having subjects make choices between
different monetary distributions regarding themselves and an
unspeciﬁedother(Liebrand,1984;HarunoandFrith,2010).Social
value orientation, like empathy, is considered to be a trait-like,
stable disposition (Van Lange, 1999). However, recent evidence
suggeststhatsocialvalueorientationtowardaninteractionpartner
canchange,dependingonthesuccessorfailureof anintermediate
interaction (van Dijk et al., 2002). A complementary inﬂuence
on prosocial behavior might therefore be the development of
interpersonalties,orfeelingsofsocialconnectednesswithaninter-
action partner. Such ties are different from empathy in that they
consistof theextenttowhichsomeonecaresaboutanotherperson
(van Dijk et al., 2002), rather than one’s ability to share some-
one’semotions(Eisenberg,2000;deWaal,2008;SingerandLamm,
2009). The degree to which one is able to experience empathy
seems to be a personality characteristic (Mehrabian, 1997; Singer
et al.,2004b),while interpersonal ties are dynamic,resulting from
interaction itself (van Dijk et al., 2002; van Winden et al., 2008).
Positivelydevelopingtiesmayinstillprosocialbehavior,whileneg-
atively developing ties may be associated with antisocial behavior,
such as a reduced willingness to invest further in the other’s well-
being, or even vengeful behavior, such as punishing the other at a
cost to oneself (Fehr and Gächter, 2002).
Compared to empathy, the cognitive, affective, and neural
mechanisms of interpersonal ties have remained relatively exempt
of empirical scrutiny. Various studies have focused on normative
aspectsofsocialinteractions,suchastrust(King-Casasetal.,2005)
andfairness(Singeretal.,2006).Otherstudieshavefocusedonthe
neural basis of cooperation itself. For example, left orbitofrontal
cortex (OFC) and medial parts of the frontal cortex have been
associated with cooperative and competitive behavior respectively
(Decetyetal.,2004).Cooperativebehaviorinaniteratedprisoner’s
dilemma game has also been found to elicit increased activity in
reward-related areas such as the striatum (Moll et al.,2006; Haber
and Knutson, 2010), as well as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(VMPFC)andtheOFC(Rillingetal.,2002).Increased(decreased)
VMPFC activation has further been found when inferring gener-
ous (selﬁsh) play in a public good game played by others (Cooper
et al., 2010). Although these regions may be involved in the for-
mation of interpersonal ties, it is unknown whether they are also
involved in keeping track of such ties over longer periods of time.
Studies on social cognition point to the relevance of the posterior
superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) in representing the social signif-
icance of other agents. For example, gray matter density abnor-
malities in the STS have been associated with autism in children
(Boddaert et al., 2004), stimuli that have acquired relevance dur-
ing meaningful social interaction (e.g., faces of cooperative game
partners) have been shown to activate the pSTS (Singer et al.,
2004a);the(p)STSisimportantinkeepingtrackof one’sinﬂuence
on other agent’s intentions and strategies (Hampton et al., 2008;
Haruno and Kawato, 2009); and activation of the pSTS during
the perception of agency correlates with individuals’self-reported
altruism (Tankersley et al., 2007).
To determine the inﬂuence of empathy and interpersonal ties
in determining prosocial behavior, we ﬁrst established the pres-
ence of neural responses related to empathy and interpersonal
ties during computer controlled (imposed) sharing. In a second
step, we determined how these neural responses related to previ-
ous cooperation success and whether they predicted subsequent
prosocial behavior. To establish neural empathy and tie-related
responses during computer-imposed sharing, we administered a
distributional outcome test (DOT; Liebrand, 1984; Haruno and
Frith, 2010), with monetary outcomes beneﬁting the other at
the expense of oneself and vice versa (see Table 1), both before
and after anonymous interaction in a public good game. In the
DOT, subjects were repeatedly confronted with changing payoff
distributions, of which the computer would choose one on each
trial. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to
examine individual differences in the neural responses to DOT
outcomes. Subtracting fMRI responses during the pre-interaction
DOTfromtheresponsesduringthepost-interactionDOT,allowed
us to isolate neural responses to sharing that could be related to
the intermediate public good game interaction (see Materials and
Methods). Choices between distributional outcomes were made
by the computer, kept equal across participants, and kept equal
between pre- and post-interaction DOTs, to ensure that neural
responses could be compared across time and across participants.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SUBJECTS
We collected data from 34 interaction pairs. Due to our complex
experimental setup,ﬁve subjects had to be excluded from analysis
because of computer or human error during data collection and
transfer.SubjectswerestudentsfromtheUniversityofAmsterdam
or international exchange students enrolled in courses at the Uni-
versity of Amsterdam. All subjects gave written informed consent
priortotheonsetoftheexperiment.The29subjectsinthescanner
had an average age of 22.6 (SD±2.7), 14 were female. Their 29
interactionpartnershadanaverageageof 23.3(SD±4.5),11were
female. In 14 interaction pairs both partners had the same sex. In
ﬁve pairs both partners were female. Chi-square and t-tests con-
ﬁrmed that the scanning group did not differ signiﬁcantly from
the group outside the scanner in age,sex,or any of the behavioral
measures.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
Subjects were tested in pairs. One subject was positioned in the
scannerwhiletheotherwasseatedinaseparateroombehindalap-
top.Theprocedurewasfullyanonymous,suchthatsubjectswould
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Table 1 |Alternatives during the scanned pre- and post-interaction distributional outcome test (DOT).
Trial AlternativeA Alternative B Other gains at
expense of self
Self gains at
expense of other
Equality in one of
the alternatives
Self Other Self Other
1 500 0 498 44 x
2 498 44 492 87 x
3 492 87 483 129 x
4 483 129 470 171 x
5 470 171 354 354 x
6 354 354 171 470 x
7 498 44 500 0 x
8 492 87 498 44 x
9 483 129 492 87 x
10 470 171 483 129 x
11 354 354 470 171 x
12 171 470 354 354 x
13 −500 0 −498 −44 x
14 −498 −44 −492 −87 x
15 −492 −87 −483 −129 x
16 −483 −129 −470 −171 x
17 −470 −171 −354 −354 x
18 −354 −354 −171 −470 x
19 −498 −44 −500 0 x
20 −492 −87 −498 −44 x
21 −483 −129 −492 −87 x
22 −470 −171 −483 −129 x
23 −354 −354 −470 −171 x
24 −171 −470 −354 −354 x
S u m 00 00
The temporal order in which the trials were presented was randomized for each subject. Whether an alternative would appear on the screen as (Alternative A) or
(Alternative B) was randomized on every trial.The computer would always choose what is designated here as (Alternative A).
never see each other or get any information about the other sub-
ject other than through computer-interfaced interaction during
the public good game. The study was divided into two main parts:
(1)ascanningphaseand(2)apost-scanningpartinwhichsubjects
ﬁlledoutexitquestionsandanempathyquestionnaire.Afterward,
subjectswerepaidout.Averageearningstotaledtoaround45euros
per subject.
The scanning phase consisted of three scanning blocks. In the
ﬁrst block, we administered a pre-interaction DOT to test neural
responsestodifferentmonetarydistributions.Inthesecondblock,
thesubjectpairplayedatwo-personpublicgoodgame.Inthethird
block subjects were administered a post-interaction DOT. Right
after the post-interaction DOT,subjects played the ﬁnal rounds of
the public good game. After scanning, subjects completed a gen-
eral exit questionnaire and the balanced emotional empathy scale
(BEES; Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972; Mehrabian, 1997).
DISTRIBUTIONAL OUTCOME TEST
Before and after public good game interaction, the DOT was
administered, containing 24 test items (see Table 1). These test
items were chosen because behavioral pilot testing showed that
they discriminated most strongly between subjects when given
the ability to freely choose among them. In the DOT however,
subjects would not make a choice between the two payoff com-
binations themselves, but the computer would “randomly” pick
an alternative. Unbeknownst to subjects, computer choices were
predetermined such that the chosen alternatives and the resulting
payouts were the same between participants and between the pre-
and post-interaction DOT. Also unbeknownst to subjects, both
the sum of the chosen distributions and the sum of the alternative
distributions was zero, both for allocations to self and allocations
to other.
Atthestartof eachtrial,subjectswereaskedtocarefullyinspect
the payoff combinations presented by the computer,and to assess
whichalternativetheypreferred.Uponpressingabutton,thealter-
natives would start to alternately highlight at a decreasing rate,
until settling down on one of them (the “computer choice”). No
changes were made to the display during the ensuing 8s, so that
a clean measure of a subject’s neural response to the “computer
choice”could be taken. To keep subjects engaged in this otherwise
passive task, they were asked to subsequently indicate whether
they agreed or disagreed with the computer choice using a simple
yes/no button press, after which the test would continue to the
next trial.
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Importantly, the pre- and post-interaction DOT were identi-
cal in all respects,except for one difference. In the pre-interaction
DOT,subjectswereinformedthatthe“other”wasarandomsubject
from the experiment, while in the post-interaction DOT, subjects
wereinformedthatthe“other”wasone’s(anonymous)interaction
partner during the preceding public good game. Hence differ-
ences between neural responses to the post- and pre-interaction
DOTactedasapost–pre-interactioncontrast,isolatingdifferential
neural responses to sharing as a result of the intermediate public
goodgameinteraction.Subtractingthepre-interactionDOTfrom
the post-interaction DOT removes effects that cannot be related
to the intermediate public good game interaction.
Therefore, we subtracted the normalized pre-interaction DOT
fMRI signal from the post-interaction DOT signal, to isolate the
component of the DOT response that may have been impacted
by the intermediate public good game interaction (see below for
analysis details). This is a non-standard fMRI analysis step, but
pertinent to the type of information we wanted to extract from
ourdesign.Wewereinterestedinisolatingchangesinneuralcom-
ponents of sharing preference as a result of experience-induced
change over time (i.e., as a result of public good game inter-
action). The difference signal of neural responses acquired at
different moments in time – while keeping all other variables the
same – provided this measure.
PUBLIC GOOD GAME
The intermediate public good game was a ﬁnite, non-linear, self-
paced public good game described elsewhere (van Dijk et al.,
2002). The game consisted of 29 rounds between two sub-
jects. On every round, subjects were given 12 monetary units,
which they could divide freely between their private account
and a public account. The payoff consequences of contribu-
tions to the public account were made explicit by use of an
on-screen payoff table (see Table 2). Payoffs in this table were
g i v e nb y1 4 ∗(X +Y)+32∗(12−X)−(12−X)2 −160, where X
represents a subject’s own contribution to the public account,
while Y denotes the other subject’s contribution to the public
account. The Pareto-optimum was at 10 tokens in the public
good, but players could decide to invest more than 10 tokens,
increasingtheother’spayoffatone’sownexpense.Likewise,partic-
ipants could invest less than the Nash-equilibrium (three tokens),
resultinginapayoffbelowNashfortheotheratone’sownexpense.
Priortothepublicgoodgame,extensiveon-screeninstructions
were given, followed by nine multiple-choice questions to check
understanding. At round 25, the public good game was unex-
pectedly interrupted for the post-interaction DOT. Right after
the post-interaction DOT subjects ﬁnished the last four rounds
of the public good game. At the end of the experiment, payoffs
were converted to real currency and paid out along with the other
payouts.
POST-SCAN QUESTIONNAIRES FOR EMPATHY AND INTERPERSONAL
TIES
After scanning, subjects completed an exit questionnaire and an
empathy scale questionnaire. Interpersonal ties were measured
during the exit questionnaire. Subjects were asked to indicate the
interpersonaltietheyfeltwiththesubjecttheyhadinteractedwith
during the public good game. The question was:
Pleaseindicateonthescalebelowhowmuchyoulikeordislikethe
participant you were paired with in part 2 and 3 of the experiment.
Circlethenumberofyourchoice,where1standsfor“veryunpleasant
person” and 9 stands for “very nice person.”
Below was a 9-point scale running from“very unpleasant per-
son” to “very nice person.” Note that a value below ﬁve signals
a negative tie, whereas a value above ﬁve signals a positive tie.
Ratings emanated from previous cooperation success, as there
T a b l e2|P a y o f ftable during the public good game.
Other
Public Y 0 1234567891 0 1 1 1 2
X P r i v a t e 1 2 1 1 1 0 9876543210
Y
o
u
0 12 80 94 108 122 136 150 164 178 192 206 220 234 248
1 11 85 99 113 127 141 155 169 183 197 211 225 239 253
2 10 88 102 116 130 144 158 172 186 200 214 228 242 256
3 9 89 103 117 131 145 159 173 187 201 215 229 243 257
4 8 88 102 116 130 144 158 172 186 200 214 228 242 256
5 7 85 99 113 127 141 155 169 183 197 211 225 239 253
6 6 80 94 108 122 136 150 164 178 192 206 220 234 248
7 5 73 87 101 115 129 143 157 171 185 199 213 227 241
8 4 64 78 92 106 120 134 148 162 176 190 204 218 232
9 3 53 67 81 95 109 123 137 151 165 179 193 207 221
10 2 40 54 68 82 96 110 124 138 152 166 180 194 208
11 1 25 39 53 67 81 95 109 123 137 151 165 179 193
12 0 82 23 65 06 47 89 21 0 6 1 2 0 1 3 4 1 4 8 1 6 2 176
X denotes a participant’s own contribution to the public account,Y denotes the other’s contribution to the public account. Private is what is left in a participant’s private
account given that contribution level.The cell where X andY cross shows one’s own payoff given those contribution levels.
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were no encounters between partners other than during anony-
mous interaction in the public good game. In addition, the exit
questionnaire contained some questions on interaction strategy
and control questions to check whether there had indeed been
no contact with the other subject other than through computer-
mediated interaction. To assess trait empathy, subjects completed
the BEES (Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972; Mehrabian, 1997) after
they had completed the exit questionnaire.
PAST COOPERATION SUCCESS AND FUTURE INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR
As a measure of previous cooperation success, we calculated the
other’s average contribution to the public good in the last ﬁve
rounds prior to the second DOT (round 21–25; van Dijk et al.,
2002). Future investment behavior was deﬁned as a player’s own
average contribution to the public good in the rounds following
the second DOT (round 26–28). The ﬁnal round (round 29) was
notincludedintheaveragebecauseof thewell-known“end”effect
(Ledyard,1995).A t-test conﬁrmed that contribution in round 29
differedsigniﬁcantlyfromcontributioninround28[t(28)=2.22,
p =0.03], while this was not the case between round 28 and 27
[t(28)=0.81,p =0.42]orbetweenround27and26[t(28)=0.85,
p =0.40]. There was also no change between round 25 and round
26, either in one’s own contribution [t(28)=0.57, p =0.57] or
in the other’s contribution to the public good [t(28)=1.22,
p =0.23], showing that the interruption by the second DOT did
not signiﬁcantly impact subsequent public good game behavior.
Control analyses conﬁrmed that changing the size of the interval
over which interaction success or future investment behavior was
measured did not change the results.
IMAGE ACQUISITION AND PRE-PROCESSING
Images were acquired on a Philips 3T Intera scanner. The func-
tional recordings were acquired using a T2∗-weighted sequence
[40 coronal slices; ﬂip angle (FA),80˚; echo time (TE),30ms; rep-
etition time (TR),2.3s;slice thickness,3mm;ﬁeld of view (FOV),
220mm×220mm;in-planevoxelresolution,2.3mm×2.3mm].
Sessions ended with the acquisition of a high-resolution anatom-
ical image using a T1 turbo ﬁeld echo sequence [182 coronal
slices; FA, 8˚; TE, 4.6ms; TR, 9.6s; slice thickness, 1.2mm, FOV,
256mm×256mm; in-plane voxel resolution, 1mm×1mm].
Pre-processing and data analysis was performed using the fMRI
expert analysis tool (FEAT), v5.98 from the FMRIB’s soft-
ware library (FSL) package (http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). fMRI
images were motion corrected, slice-time aligned, aligned to the
structural image of the subject, and spatially smoothed using a
Gaussiankernelof 5mmandhigh-passtemporallyﬁlteredusinga
Gaussian envelope of 50s.Anatomical brains were extracted from
the structural images, and transformed to the standard space of
the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) using FMRIB’s non-
linearimageregistrationtool(FNIRT).Finally,thefunctionaldata
were co-registered to the MNI brain using non-linear parameters
obtained from FNIRT.
DATA ANALYSIS
For each subject, general linear models (GLMs) were speciﬁed
separately for the pre- and post-interaction DOT. A predictor was
created for each trial, corresponding to the moment at which the
“computer choice” (see Table 1) was presented to the subject. All
predictors were convolved with a standard double gamma hemo-
dynamic response function. The resulting GLMs were applied to
the (pre-processed) fMRI signals that were acquired during the
pre- and post-interaction DOT.
Next, the mean percent signal change on each trial of the
pre- and post-interaction DOT was extracted for each subject
and each region of interest (ROI). Trials were averaged depend-
ing on the sharing context (see Table 1): for each subject and
each ROI, an average was created for trials in which the other
obtained monetary gains at the expense of oneself (“Other gains
at expense of Self”), and another average was created for trials in
which oneself gained at the expense of the other (“Self gains at
expense of Other”), separately for the pre- and post-interaction
DOT. Subsequently, the resulting pre-interaction DOT averages
weresubtractedfromthepost-interactionDOTaveragesof corre-
spondingsharingcontexts,isolatingthepartoftheneuralresponse
thatwasaffectedbytheintermediatepublicgoodgameexperience,
while subtracting out the bare neural responses to the monetary
divisions in these sharing contexts (which were equal in both
DOTs).
The post- minus pre-public good game interaction DOT dif-
ference signals from these sharing contexts (“Self gains at expense
of Other” and “Other gains at expense of Self”) for each of the
ROIs were correlated against the empathy and interpersonal tie
measures,aswellasagainstthemeasuresforpastcooperationsuc-
cess and future investment behavior. Because we computed a lot
of correlations, one needs to correct for multiple comparisons, as
some correlations will turn up signiﬁcant at the conventional 0.05
level by chance alone. We corrected for multiple comparisons by
meansof thefalsediscoveryrate(FDR)correction,whichﬁxesthe
expectedproportionofincorrectlyrejectednullhypotheses(typeI
errors) given the number of tests that were performed (Benjamini
and Hochberg,1995). All reported statistics in the experiment are
two-tailed.
To summarize, the subtraction method and the FDR correc-
tion each correct for a potential source of spurious correlation:
(1) The subtraction of the pre-interaction DOT from the post-
interaction DOT isolates the part of the signal that can be related
to the intermediate public good game. The subtraction method
removes correlations between the DOT and our dependent mea-
sures that are not related to the intermediate public good game.
Such correlations may be coincidental but “real” within the spe-
ciﬁcsamplethatwemeasuredfrom,ortheymayevenberealinthe
population at large. Regardless, the subtraction method removes
them.(2)TheFDRcorrectionthresholdstheresultingpost-minus
pre-interactioncorrelationssuchthattheycannotbeattributedto
measurement errors (noise). The correlations that are identiﬁed
using the combination of these two methods can therefore be
attributed to the intermediate public good game, and cannot be
attributed to chance.
To establish whether empathy and interpersonal ties might
interact to predict behavior, we carried out a regression analysis.
We used the BEES and liking ratings as measures for empathy and
social ties respectively. An interaction term of the two was added.
All terms were regressed onto the subject’s future contributions in
the three rounds following the second DOT.
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SELECTION OF REGIONS OF INTEREST
For ROI selection, the results from the lower level DOT analy-
sis were combined using a ﬁxed effects higher-level analysis, in
which corresponding trials from the pre- and post-interaction
DOT were matched. Note that in this particular analysis, trials
from the pre- and post-interaction DOT were combined (effec-
tively averaged), rather than subtracted. Subsequently, the result-
ing individual subject statistics were analyzed at a group level
using FMRIB’s Local Analysis of Mixed Effects (FLAME1). At
this stage, an F-test was performed over all 24 trials, allowing
us to test in a non-directional way in what regions the combined
pre- and post-interaction DOT contributed signiﬁcantly to the
fMRI signal at a group level. By using a non-directional F-test,
the statistics were indifferent to the direction of hemodynamic
changes between different types of trials within the DOT. Clus-
ters with Z-values higher than 3.1 (uncorrected) were considered
for inclusion as ROIs into the ﬁnal analysis. From these clusters,
FIGURE 1 | Regions of interest involved in empathy (ACC, bilateral
AIC), social signiﬁcance (bilateral pSTS) and reward processing
(striatum). Cross-sections of the brain are shown at MNI coordinates
X =4,Y =25, and Z =−8. Voxels shown exceed an uncorrected threshold
of Z >3.1 (p <0 . 0 0 1 )o na nF-test over the averaged pre- and
post-interaction DOT trials (also see Figure 2 and Materials and Methods).
ROIs were selected on anatomical grounds that are known to be
involved in reward processing (striatum; Rilling et al., 2002; Moll
et al., 2006; Haber and Knutson, 2010), empathy [anterior insu-
lar cortex (AIC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)] (Wicker
et al., 2003; Singer et al., 2004b; Singer and Lamm, 2009), social
signiﬁcance (pSTS; Singer et al., 2004a; Tankersley et al., 2007;
Hampton et al., 2008), and social decision-making (VMPFC and
OFC; Rilling et al., 2002; Decety et al., 2004). As striatal activity
was part of a larger cluster, we extracted voxels from this cluster
using the Harvard–Oxford Subcortical Structural Atlas included
in the FSL package. Only voxels that had more than 50% prob-
ability of belonging to the nucleus accumbens (ventral striatum)
or caudate (dorsal striatum) were included. No voxels exceeded
the threshold in the putamen. See Figure 1 for selected clusters.
For the entire activation map of the F-test and the selection of
ventralanddorsalstriatumseeFigure2,foralistof allclusterssee
Table 3.
Because the DOT data used for ROI selection were also used
during hypothesis testing, a possible concern could be selection
bias resulting from the non-independence error or “double dip-
ping”(Kriegeskorte et al.,2009). However,the statistical tests used
duringhypothesistestingwerenotaffectedbycircularity.Forone,
the result statistics used during ROI selection were different from
those used during hypothesis testing. ROI selection was done on
theaveragedpre-andpost-interactionDOT,whileduringhypoth-
esis testing the pre- interaction DOT was subtracted from the
post-interactionDOT.Moretothepointhowever,hypothesistest-
ingwasdonebycorrelatingthisdifferencesignalagainstmeasures
of empathy,interpersonalties,andinteractionsuccess,whilenone
of these behavioral measures were used when generating the F-
statistics used for ROI selection. Critically, this ensured that none
of our results could be explained by double dipping.
FIGURE 2 | Regions activated by an F-test over the 24 trials from
the (averaged) pre- and post-interaction DOT. Voxels exceeding
Z =3.1 (p <0.001, uncorrected) in clusters larger than 40 voxels are
shown in green, with selected regions of interest (AIC, ACC,
striatum, pSTS, VMPFC, and left OFC) shown in hot (yellow/orange;
top).Ventral and dorsal striatum are depicted separately in blue/green
(bottom).Table 3 lists all clusters and MNI coordinates of cluster
peak values.
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Table 3 | Locus of peak activations in clusters resulting from an F-test over the 24 trials from the (averaged) pre- and post-interaction DOT
(Z >3.1, cluster size>40).
Cluster index Brain region MNI coordinates of
peak activation (mm)
Z score
xyz
1 Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) −26 4 −10 4
2 Left posterior superior temporal sulcus −56 −40 −6 4.43
3 Left orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) −22 48 −26 5.32
4 Right posterior superior temporal sulcus 62 −26 −10 4.73
5 Near right lateral ventricle 26 −44 16 6.11
6 Left anterior insular cortex (AIC) −30 26 −6 6.31
7 Left precuneus −8 −52 28 4.42
8 Left central opercular cortex (middle part of the Sylvian ﬁssure) −66 −14 8 5
9 Left angular gyrus −50 −72 30 4.26
10 Left parietal opercular cortex (posterior part of the Sylvian ﬁssure) −46 −36 16 6.37
11 Left postcentral gyrus −38 −22 50 7 .91
12 Right anterior insular cortex (AIC) 34 24 −6 8.21
13 Left superior temporal gyrus (posterior) 64 −30 14 7 .05
14 Mid cingulate cortex (MCC) 4 0 28 6.62
15 Posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) 2 −34 26 6.88
16 Left early visual cortex (V1, V2, V3) −16 −88 −20 8.21
17 Right early visual cortex (V1, V2, V3) 20 −90 −18 8.21
18 Left Precentral Gyrus −44 −2 26 8.21
19 Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 2 24 38 8.21
20 Occipitoparietal cortex, extending into precentral gyrus and inferior frontal gyrus
on the right, and into cerebellum, brain stem, thalamus, and striatum ventrally
0 −78 20 8.21
Regions of interest used in subsequent analyses are underlined.
RESULTS
ORTHOGONALITY OF TRAIT EMPATHY AND INTERPERSONAL TIES
Trait empathy was measured post-experimentally using the BEES
(Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972; Mehrabian, 1997). Interpersonal
tiesweremeasuredinanexitquestionnaireinwhichsubjectswere
asked to rate how much they liked or disliked their interaction
partner. To assess whether these measures were somehow corre-
lated,we calculated their correlation coefﬁcient. This showed that
our empathy and our interpersonal ties measure were unrelated
(r =−0.06,p =0.76).
NEURAL CORRELATES OF EMPATHY DURING IMPOSED SHARING
In order to assess the presence of neural correlates of trait empa-
thy during imposed sharing, we correlated BEES scores with the
post- minus pre-interaction neural DOT responses during the
“Self gains at expense of Other” and “Other gains at expense of
Self”sharing contexts, in all regions of interest (see Table 4). The
FDR-corrected signiﬁcance level at which these correlations were
evaluated is 0.0043, as marked by three asterisks (see bottom of
Table 4 on the next page). After correction for multiple com-
parisons, the BEES scores showed correlations in AIC [r =0.61,
p =0.0004] (Figure 3, top), ACC (r =0.64, p =0.0002; Figure 3,
middle), and the striatum [r =0.53, p =0.0043] (Figure 3, bot-
tom). This shows that responses in these areas were stronger
for empathic subjects than for non-empathic subjects after, but
not before interaction (Figure 4). Notably, empathy only cor-
related with neural responses to sharing when the other gained
at one’s own expense, and not the other way around (all
p >0.3).
NEURAL CORRELATES OF INTERPERSONAL TIES DURING IMPOSED
SHARING
Similar to the empathy analyses, we correlated liking ratings
with post- minus pre-interaction neural DOT responses in both
sharing contexts for all regions of interest (see Table 4). After
correction for multiple comparisons, only the pSTS correlated
signiﬁcantly with our interpersonal tie measure, and only when
oneself gains at the expense of the other (r =0.58, p =0.0011),
and not vice versa (r =0.32, p =0.0928; Figure 5, top). This
suggests that gaining at another person’s expense invokes acti-
vation in the pSTS, where the degree of activation correlates
positively with the interpersonal tie one has developed with
that person during previous interaction. Receiving reward at
another’s expense may invoke a tie-related response in the pSTS,
where a strong response corresponds with a positive interper-
sonal tie with the other person, and a weak response corre-
sponds with a negative tie. Again, the correlation is speciﬁc
to the post- minus pre-interaction DOT, emphasizing the rel-
evance of the intermediate interaction in driving the response
(Figure 6).
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Table 4 | Correlations for sharing with measures of empathy, social ties, past cooperation success, and future investment behavior.
Region of interest Self gains at the
expense of other
Other gains at the
expense of self
Pearson p-Value Pearson p-Value
CORRELATIONSWITH BALANCED EMOTIONAL EMPATHY SCALE (BEES)
Anterior insular cortex (AIC) 0.03 0.8582 0.61 0.0004***
Left AIC −0.06 0.7632 0.63 0.0003***
Right AIC 0.16 0.4079 0.46 0.0127*
Striatum −0.18 0.3507 0.52 0.0043***
Dorsal striatum (caudate) −0.10 0.5940 0.55 0.0020***
Left dorsal striatum −0.17 0.3831 0.43 0.0203*
Right dorsal striatum −0.01 0.9485 0.59 0.0008***
Ventral striatum (nucleus accumbens) −0.23 0.2304 0.39 0.0344*
Left ventral striatum 0.00 0.9914 0.16 0.3941
Right ventral striatum −0.37 0.0495* 0.48 0.0089**
Posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) −0.20 0.2999 0.28 0.1396
Left pSTS −0.21 0.2639 0.27 0.1645
Right pSTS −0.12 0.5230 0.19 0.3299
Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 0.14 0.4607 0.64 0.0002***
Left orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) −0.14 0.4680 0.18 0.3472
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) −0.04 0.8170 0.38 0.0447*
CORRELATIONSWITH 9-POINT LIKE SCALE (INTERPERSONALTIE)
Anterior insular cortex (AIC) 0.19 0.3270 −0.12 0.5420
Left AIC 0.18 0.3566 −0.08 0.6744
Right AIC 0.14 0.4591 −0.14 0.4571
Striatum 0.09 0.6362 0.11 0.5562
Dorsal striatum (caudate) 0.21 0.2718 0.11 0.5875
Left dorsal striatum 0.21 0.2695 0.21 0.2786
Right dorsal striatum 0.18 0.3585 −0.01 0.9613
Ventral striatum (nucleus accumbens) −0.07 0.7293 0.10 0.5887
Left ventral striatum −0.15 0.4435 0.23 0.2341
Right ventral striatum 0.01 0.9594 −0.06 0.7757
Posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) 0.58 0.0011*** 0.32 0.0928
Left pSTS 0.40 0.0312* 0.01 0.9485
Right pSTS 0.57 0.0013*** 0.54 0.0027***
Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 0.26 0.1684 −0.08 0.6835
Left orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) −0.45 0.0149* 0.27 0.1630
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) −0.12 0.5337 −0.06 0.7670
CORRELATIONSWITH CONTRIBUTION OF OTHER IN ROUND 21–25 (PREVIOUS COOPERATION SUCCESS)
Anterior insular cortex (AIC) −0.13 0.5160 −0.20 0.3105
Left AIC −0.04 0.8382 −0.24 0.2062
Right AIC −0.21 0.2732 −0.09 0.6486
Striatum 0.29 0.1209 0.01 0.9705
Dorsal striatum (caudate) 0.34 0.0684 0.02 0.9200
Left dorsal striatum 0.43 0.0201* 0.11 0.5619
Right dorsal striatum 0.19 0.3227 −0.07 0.7080
Ventral striatum (nucleus accumbens) 0.17 0.3664 −0.01 0.9707
Left ventral striatum 0.11 0.5854 0.01 0.9729
Right ventral striatum 0.19 0.3132 −0.02 0.9257
Posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) 0.63 0.0003*** 0.38 0.0413*
Left pSTS 0.68 0.0000*** 0.22 0.2610
Right pSTS 0.38 0.0436* 0.42 0.0245*
Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 0.08 0.6826 −0.13 0.5135
(Continued)
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Table 4 | Continued
Region of interest Self gains at the
expense of other
Other gains at the
expense of self
Pearson p-Value Pearson p-Value
Left orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) −0.19 0.3304 −0.01 0.9397
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) 0.04 0.8315 0.11 0.5656
CORRELATIONSWITH CONTRIBUTION OF SELF IN ROUND 26–28 (FUTURE INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR)
Anterior insular cortex (AIC) 0.01 0.9629 0.14 0.4710
Left AIC 0.08 0.6689 0.11 0.5857
Right AIC −0.10 0.5981 0.16 0.4176
Striatum 0.29 0.1209 0.33 0.0809
Dorsal striatum (caudate) 0.33 0.0793 0.34 0.0754
Left dorsal striatum 0.38 0.0420* 0.43 0.0185*
Right dorsal striatum 0.22 0.2444 0.19 0.3207
Ventral striatum (nucleus accumbens) 0.19 0.3285 0.27 0.1574
Left ventral striatum 0.14 0.4651 0.22 0.2530
Right ventral striatum 0.19 0.3279 0.22 0.2499
Posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) 0.58 0.0009*** 0.47 0.0108*
Left pSTS 0.60 0.0006*** 0.29 0.1293
Right pSTS 0.39 0.0371* 0.48 0.0081**
Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 0.16 0.4054 0.21 0.2844
Left orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) −0.12 0.5450 0.05 0.7980
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) −0.13 0.4989 −0.12 0.5288
N=29.
*p≤0.05.
**p≤0.01.
***p≤0.0043, False discovery rate (FDR) corrected value of 0.05 over all correlations in the table.
RELATIONSHIP TO PAST COOPERATION SUCCESS AND FUTURE
INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR
To determine the degree to which these sharing-related responses
aredrivenbypastcooperationsuccess,and/orpredictcooperation
inthecontinuationof thepublicgoodgameafterthesecondDOT,
wecorrelatedallpost-minuspre-DOTresponseswithpastcooper-
ation success and future behavior (Table 4,second part). Previous
cooperation success was deﬁned as the other’s mean contribution
to the public good in the ﬁve rounds prior to administering the
post-interaction DOT (van Dijk et al., 2002), while future coop-
eration was deﬁned as one’s own mean contribution to the public
good in the three rounds after the second DOT (see Materials and
Methods). Past cooperation success (Figure 5, middle) as well as
future cooperation (Figure 5, bottom) in the public good game
correlated only with the pSTS, again particularly for outcomes
that entail gains at the expense of the other (past success:r =0.63,
p =0.0003; future cooperation: r =0.58,p =0.0009).
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF EMPATHY–TIE INTERACTION
Finally, we wanted to determine whether our empathy and inter-
personal ties measures – or their interaction – might be used to
predict cooperative behavior directly. We carried out a regres-
sion analyses, in which we regressed our behavioral measures for
empathy and interpersonal ties, plus an interaction term, onto
the average contribution to the public good in the rounds fol-
lowing the second DOT (our behavioral measure for cooperative
behavior in the public good game). The overall model was signiﬁ-
cant:[F(3,25)=3.59,p =0.0277].Moreover,itwasdrivenonlyby
our interpersonal ties measure (p =0.004), and not by the BEES
(p =0.184) or by the interaction of the two (p =0.171). This
result conﬁrms the inﬂuence of interpersonal ties – rather than
empathy – in establishing prosocial behavior during interaction.
DISCUSSION
We isolated the inﬂuence of public good game interaction on
neural responses in different sharing contexts, by subtracting
normalized fMRI signals that were separated in time by the inter-
action. We investigated the post- minus pre-interaction differ-
ence signal in these sharing contexts (other gains at one’s own
expense and vice versa), subtracting out the raw neural responses
to the division of monetary resources themselves. This somewhat
unconventionalanalysismethodallowedustouniquelyisolatethe
inﬂuence of intermediate public good game interaction on neural
responses during imposed sharing, and determine the relation
of these responses to empathy, interpersonal ties, past coopera-
tion success, and future prosocial investment behavior. We found
neural correlates of empathy and interpersonal tie measures in
these interaction-related fMRI signals, showing that our neural
correlates of these measures depend on the intermediate public
good game interaction. Moreover, we show that the neural cor-
relate of the interpersonal tie measure is uniquely related to past
cooperation success and future prosocial investment behavior.
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FIGURE 3 | Correlations between empathy scores (BEES) and Δ
percent signal change of post- minus pre-interaction DOT. Correlations
are shown for AIC (top) and ACC (middle) and striatum (bottom) for trials in
which the other gains at the expense of oneself (left panels, in red), and for
those in which oneself gains at the expense of the other (right panels, in
blue). Correlations before and after public good game interaction separately
can be found in Figure 4. All correlations are listed inTable 4.
Although neural correlates of empathy only emerged after
having interacted with the other participant (Figure4),these cor-
relates could not be related to previous cooperation success or to
future choice behavior (Table 4). Thus,while these correlates only
emerged as a result of interaction,they do not seem to result from
speciﬁcchoiceoutcomes,orresultinspeciﬁcchoices.Thissuggests
thattherelationshipbetweentraitempathyandeconomicinterac-
tion is more generic. One possibility may be that trait empathy is
onlyexpressedwhentheotherpersonturnsouttobea“real”actor
in the world. Bear in mind that during the pre-interaction DOT,
subjects are told that the“other”is a random anonymous subject
fromtheexperimentandthatthereisnointeractionwiththatpar-
ticipant. The combination of anonymity and a lack of interaction
FIGURE 4 | Correlations between scores on the BEES and percent
signal change inAIC (top),ACC (middle), and striatum (bottom),
separately for the pre- and post-interaction DOT. Correlations are shown
for sharing in which the other gains at the expense of self (in red), and for
sharing in which oneself gains at the expense of the other (in blue),
separately for the DOT prior to interaction (pre-interaction, ﬁrst and third
column) and for the second DOT (post-interaction, second and forth
column).
mayleadtodehumanization,lesseningempathicresponsesduring
the pre-interaction DOT (Cehajic et al., 2009).
The pSTS correlate of the interpersonal tie on the other hand,
exhibits a more speciﬁc interaction-related pattern. Like empathy,
it only emerges as a result of public good game interaction. How-
ever, this signal could also be linked to previous cooperation
success and to future cooperative choice behavior in subsequent
rounds of the public good game. Moreover, tie-related activity
only correlated with pSTS activation in the context of receiving a
monetary reward at the expense of the other. This seems to link
pSTS activation to positive choice outcomes. Possibly, the degree
to which self-favoring outcomes engender activation in the pSTS
depends directly on past cooperation success, extending previous
ﬁndings on the role of the pSTS in tracking the effects of one’s
actions on other agents’ decisions (Hampton et al., 2008). Sim-
ilarly, Haruno and Kawato (2009) have shown that the degree
to which subjects are able to exploit other agent’s strategies is
uniquelypredictedbySTSactivity.WesuggestthatpSTSactivation
during forced sharing correlates with the interpersonal tie one has
developed with another participant during previous interaction,
even though this activation is captured outside and apart from
the interaction. This alludes to a long-term representation of the
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FIGURE 5 | Correlations between interpersonal tie-scores (top), past
cooperation success (middle) as well as future investment behavior
(bottom), and Δ percent signal change of post- minus pre-interaction
DOT. Correlations are shown for the pSTS, for trials in which the other gains
at the expense of oneself (left panels, in red), and for those in which
oneself gains at the expense of the other (right panels, in blue).
Correlations before and after public good game interaction separately can
be found in Figure 6. All correlations are listed inTable 4.
interpersonal tie that outlasts representations that are temporally
contained within the time frame of the interaction itself.
Taken together, our results suggest that during economic
interaction, tie-related mechanisms are more closely involved in
experience-based choice than trait empathy. As we established
that our trait empathy measure and our interpersonal tie mea-
surewereuncorrelated,itseemsunlikelythattraitempathyplaysa
directroleintheformationof interpersonaltiesandchoicebehav-
ior during economic interaction. However, trait empathy might
play a modulating role in determining the inﬂuence of interper-
sonal ties on experience-based choice. A regression analysis of
our empathy and interpersonal ties measures together with an
interaction term established that only interpersonal ties predicted
FIGURE 6 | Correlations between liking (top), past cooperation success
(middle) and future investment behavior (bottom), and percent signal
change in the pSTS, separately for the pre- and post-interaction DOT.
Correlations are shown for sharing in which the other gains at the expense
of self (in red), and for sharing in which oneself gains at the expense of the
other (in blue), separately for the DOT prior to interaction (pre-interaction,
ﬁrst and third column) and for the second DOT (post-interaction, second
and forth column).
cooperative behavior. This suggests that neither trait empathy,
nor its interaction with interpersonal ties, determines subsequent
choice behavior.
Importantly,wemeasuredempathyinourexperimentbyestab-
lishingthedegreetowhichsomeoneisabletoexperienceempathic
emotions. Therefore, only trait-like aspects of empathy were con-
sidered. However, the degree to which empathy is experienced at
any given moment in time can change depending on the situ-
ational context. For example, a person may feel more empathy
toward a person that behaves nicely than toward a person that
does not (Singer et al., 2006). As we did not measure the degree
of empathy experienced during the experiment directly, we could
notassesstheinﬂuenceofempathicexperienceonchoicebehavior
directly. Other studies suggest that feelings of empathy or activ-
ity in empathy-related networks do play a role during prosocial
behavior(Heinetal.,2010;Mastenetal.,2011),whichseemstobe
at odds with the ﬁndings we present here. Importantly however,
these studies investigated non-interactive instances of prosocial
behavior,inwhichtheotherisnotexpectedtoreciprocatethegood
deed bestowed onto them. Experiments like these often use verbal
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descriptions or passive viewing of characters. In our experiment,
participants were involved in actual interaction with interaction
partners.Soevenif feelingsof empathicconcernplayaroleduring
choice behavior,our results suggest that in interactive experience-
based contexts such as the one investigated here, this inﬂuence
cannot be traced back to a stable empathic trait.
We ﬁnd correlations between trait empathy and the AIC and
ACC only when the other gains at one’s own expense, and not
when resource transfer is in the opposite direction. In the DOT,
negative(resource-losing)eventsforoneself gohandinhandwith
positive (resource-gaining) events for the other. Hence, outcomes
that beneﬁt the other at one’s own expense can either be inter-
preted as“painful”(resource-losing) events for oneself,as positive
(resource-gaining) events for the other,or as a combination of the
two.AICandACChavebeenimplicatedinempathyforbothposi-
tive(Jabbietal.,2007)andnegative(Wickeretal.,2003)events,but
also in a more general brain network known as the“pain matrix,”
thought to be involved in the perception and appraisal of pain
(Singer et al., 2004b). Following reverse inference, one interpre-
tation might be that there is a correlation between trait empathy
and one’s own“pain”responses when having to share. If true,one
would expect to also see them in the pre-interaction DOT. This
is not the case (see Figure 4), suggesting that the correlations are
driven by empathic concern for the other’s beneﬁt as a result of
having interacted with that person,rather than by pain over one’s
own loss. In line with this interpretation, we not only found cor-
relations in AIC and ACC, but also in striatal circuitry typically
associated with reward processing (Moll et al., 2006; Haber and
Knutson, 2010). Although speculative, another person’s beneﬁt
may register more strongly as a reward signal for individuals with
higher empathy levels.
This ﬁnding is interesting in light of common theorizing about
empathy. Empathy is generally thought to be “other-oriented,”
being able to tune into or share the affective experiences of oth-
ers (positive or negative; de Waal, 2008; Singer and Lamm, 2009).
Here, we have the special situation where a positive event for the
otherisaccompaniedbyanegativeeventforoneself andviceversa
(sharing). We only see correlations with empathy when the other
gainsatone’sownexpenseandnottheotherwayaround.Thissug-
gests that the“other-orientation”of empathy is modulated by the
direction of the resource transfer involved in sharing. Empathic
subjects engage empathy-related structures (AIC, ACC) during
sharing – even when these events are painful for themselves – but
only when their own suffering helps the other along, and not the
other way around. Although speculative, empathic subjects may
use their ability to empathize to help alleviate, counterbalance,
compensate, or justify their own suffering when having to share,
while empathy-related responses do not manifest when the tables
are turned, possibly as a result of joy over one’s own proﬁt.
More generally, the expression of neural correlates of empa-
thy and interpersonal ties in different sharing contexts may tell us
something about their function in prosocial behavior. While the
interpersonal tie correlate seems to be expressed more strongly
in a sharing context where oneself beneﬁts at the other’s expense,
the network structure involved in empathy seems to be engaged
more strongly when one suffers loss that beneﬁts another. This
may point to different functional contributions of these regions
to prosocial behavior. The pSTS may be used to keep track of
the utility that other agents constitute in the short run, enabling
immediate prosocial behavior during interaction. The empathy
network on the other hand,may work to overcome negative emo-
tionsthatareassociatedwithloss.Althoughourstudysuggeststhat
this is not translated into short-term investment choices during
economic interaction, it may enable cooperative behavior in the
long run, countering the adverse effects of absorbing temporary
loss associated with social interactions.
Summarizing, previous cooperation success and future coop-
eration did not correlate with activations in structures related
to empathy (AIC, ACC), reward (striatum), or social decision-
making (OFC, VMPFC). However, previous cooperation success
and future cooperation did correlate with pSTS activation, which
we found to be related to interpersonal ties. This suggests that
interpersonal ties and trait empathy may recruit different neural
networks, of which only the former drives cooperative behavior
during interaction. Moreover,individual differences in pSTS acti-
vation predicted individual differences in prosocial investment
behavior in subsequent rounds of the public good game. This
predictive value is important, as it suggests that the pSTS plays
a role in keeping track of the dynamically evolving interper-
sonal tie underlying the willingness to invest in a shared public
good. We conclude that during experience-based economic inter-
action, networks are engaged that keep track of interpersonal ties
over longer periods of time, possibly enabling choice–outcome
estimation in social settings, with the pSTS emerging as a key
element.
A word of caution is also in order. The regions that were
highlighted in our experiment have previously been related to
many elementary operations, of which we discuss only a few.
For example, the pSTS has also been linked to perception of
biological motion (Perrett et al., 1989; Bonda et al., 1996), per-
ception of intentional action (Castelli et al., 2000; Saxe et al.,
2004)a sw e l la ss p e e c hp e r c e p t i o n( Demonet et al., 1992; Mot-
tonen et al., 2006). AIC has been implicated in eye movements
(Anderson et al., 1994), speech production (Dronkers, 1996; Ack-
ermannandRiecker,2004),higher-orderlearning(Seymouretal.,
2004),interoceptiveawareness(Critchleyetal.,2004;Khalsaetal.,
2009), and even consciousness at large (Craig, 2009). Likewise,
the ACC has been implicated in interoception (Critchley et al.,
2004; Khalsa et al., 2009), reward based decision-making (Bush
et al., 2002), error detection and conﬂict monitoring (Gehring
etal.,1993),andvariousrelatedcognitiveandemotionalprocesses
(Lane et al., 1998; Bush et al., 2000). The striatum has tradition-
ally been implicated in planning and modulation of movement
(Rolls, 1994), but recently more prominently in reward process-
ing (Moll et al., 2006; Haber and Knutson, 2010), novelty-based
choice behavior (Wittmann et al., 2008), and higher-order learn-
ing (Seymour et al., 2004). Together, this paints a picture of a
highlycomplexnetworkinwhichregionsworktogethertoachieve
certainfunctions,plausiblyprovidingdifferentfunctionsindiffer-
ent contexts and at different moments in time. Although we have
attemptedtoisolateempathyandtie-relatedmechanisms,theidea
that these mechanisms are solely implemented in the regions that
wehighlightismostlikelyanoversimpliﬁcation.Morelikely,these
functions are achieved through interactions between and within
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regions, executing various more elementary subprocesses to pro-
vide more complex higher-order functions. Our study does not
allow us to tease apart empathy and tie-related mechanisms into
their elementary processes. However, it does provide pointers as
to where these higher-order functions seem to be expressed most
strongly, and what their role is in interactive experience-based
choice.Relatedly,itdeservesmentionthatwedidnothaveacontrol
group in which the other participant in the post-interaction DOT
waseitheranon-humanplayer(computer)oranotheranonymous
participant from the experiment. Although it is unlikely that the
speciﬁc activation patterns we observed can be attributed to non-
speciﬁc effects such as game repetition, boredom or exhaustion,
futurestudiesemployingasimilardesignmightdowelltoinclude
such controls.
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